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 On 11 December 1997, 160 countries reached an historical agreement on limiting greenhouse gas 
emissions in Kyoto, Japan. In comparison with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) at the Earth Summit in June 1992 that only committed Annex I countries2 to “aim” to 
stabilize emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases at their 1990 levels by 2000, the so-
called Kyoto Protocol sets legally binding emissions targets and timetables for these countries. Together, 
Annex I countries must reduce their emissions of six greenhouse gases by at least 5% below 1990 levels over 
the commitment period 2008-2012, with the European Union (EU), US and  Japan required to reduce their 
emissions of such gases by 8%, 7% and 6% respectively (UNFCCC, 1997). Although proposals had been 
made for differentiation of allowed emissions on the basis of indicators such as population, GDP, or carbon 
intensity of the economy, the differentiated targets agreed upon at Kyoto were purely political. The Protocol 
will become effective once it is ratified by at least 55 parties whose CO2 emissions represent at least 55% of 
the total from Annex I parties in the year 1990.3 Pushed by the US, the Kyoto Protocol also accepts the 
concept of emissions trading in principle under which one Annex I country will be allowed to purchase the 
rights to emit greenhouse gases (GHG) from other Annex I countries that are able to cut GHG emissions 
below their assigned amounts (i.e. their targets), but leaves the design of the market and its rule entirely to 
subsequent conferences. Structured effectively, the market-based emissions trading approach, pioneered in the 
US Sulphur Allowance Trading Program (McLean, 1997), can provide an economic incentive to cut GHG 
                                                          
1 This article was presented at the International Workshop on Market-based Instruments and International 
Trade, Organised by the European Union Research Network on Market-based Instruments for Sustainable 
Development, Amsterdam, March 19-20, 1998. The author would like to thank the Netherlands Organization 
for Scientific Research for financial support, and Catrinus Jepma, Andries Nentjes and Tom Tietenberg as 
well as the participants in the above Workshop for useful discussions and comments on an earlier version of 
the article. The usual caveat applies. 
2 Annex I countries refer to the OECD countries and countries with economies in transition. These 
countries have committed themselves to legally binding greenhouse gas emissions targets. 
3 Although the 55% ratification threshold is lower than 75% of the total Annex I emissions in 1990 proposed 
in earlier negotiation drafts of this article, it seems to be high. This threshold confers on the US a de facto 
power of veto, since the US accounted for nearly 40% of the total Annex I emissions in 1990. Besides the 
US insistence on the high threshold, the EU was partly responsible for this because it was unwilling to assume 
any obligations without the US signing on, just as its previous proposal for a carbon/energy tax was subject to 
whether the US took similar actions. 
emissions while also allowing flexibility for taking cost-effective actions. It is generally acknowledged that the 
inclusion of emissions trading in the Protocol is in line with the underlying principles in Article 3.3 of the 
UNFCCC, which states “policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to 
ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost”, and reflects an important decision to address climate 
change issues through flexible market mechanisms. 
 As the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) was created in 1994 upon the completion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations (WTO, 1995). Its Committee on Trade and Environment has been established to coordinate the 
policies in the field of trade and environment. The Committee’s work programme includes a review of “the 
relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and trade measures for environmental 
purposes, including those pursuant to multilateral environmental agreements” (WTO, 1995, p. 470). Although 
emissions trading has been identified for future discussion in the Committee, it has not thus far been 
examined. It remains unknown whether WTO provisions would cover an emissions trading scheme, in part 
because no interpretation exists on whether a legal definition of emissions trading would be interpreted as 
either trade in a good or trade in a service (Vaughan, 1997). No doubt, the inclusion of emissions trading in 
the Kyoto Protocol will catalyze the international consciousness for the potential of emissions trading. Clearly, 
this will provide a stimulus to addressing the market-based instrument in the Committee. 
 This article will examine the relationship between GHG emissions trading and the world trading 
system.4 Section II explains why emissions trading is considered to be the most promising way to control 
GHG emissions. Section III discusses the basic requirements for setting up a successful emissions trading 
scheme. Section IV addresses some trade-related aspects of emissions trading, while Section V relates the 
discussion to joint implementation with developing countries. The article ends with some conclusions. 
 
 
II. WHY EMISSIONS TRADING? 
 
 Greenhouse gases are uniformly mixed pollutants, i.e. one ton of a greenhouse gas emitted anywhere 
on earth has the same effect as one ton emitted somewhere else on earth. Translated into the language of 
abatement strategies, this means that it does not matter where reductions in GHG emissions take place. What 
matters is whether we are able to reduce the emissions effectively on a global scale. Given the fact that the 
costs of abating GHG emissions differ significantly among countries (see, for example, IPCC (1996)) and that, 
unlike SO2 emissions, there are no local “hot spots” for GHG emissions,5 GHG emissions trading seems to 
                                                          
4 The design of a workable emissions trading scheme is the very important issue because it is essential to 
the success of emissions trading. This has been the focus of the UNCTAD Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Trading Project (UNCTAD, 1998), the Annex I Expert Group on the UNFCCC, Zhang (1998), and Zhang 
and Nentjes (1998).  
5 The “hot spots” here refer to those localized areas of high pollution concentration. This has been major 
concern in designing a sulphur emissions trading scheme because of the spatial nature of that pollution. 
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enjoy an even better prospect for trading than SO2. This large potential of efficiency gains, backed up with the 
widely-regarded successful Sulphur Allowance Trading Program in the US,6 conveys the message that 
emissions trading is a very attractive abatement option. How does then emissions trading compare with carbon 
taxes, another economic instrument that is widely believed to be able to achieve the same emissions target at 
lower costs than the conventional command-and-control regulations?  
 In economic theory, the two instruments can achieve identical results given both perfectly 
competitive markets and certainty (Weitzman,1974;  Pezzey, 1992). In practice, however, there could be quite 
different between these two instruments. 
 Probably the most valid arguments in favour of tradeable permits rather than taxes so far are as 
follows: 
 Tradeable GHG emissions permits, unlike carbon taxes, are a form of rationing and the great 
advantage is that in this way one can be sure of achieving the target agreed.7 This feature seems to be 
appealing more than ever because Annex I parties to the Kyoto Protocol are obligated to comply with their 
legally binding emissions targets. This also makes the “ecological transparency” argument against emissions 
trading not valid anymore.8 By contrast, the actual achievements in reductions of CO2 emissions by a 
proposed carbon tax remain uncertain because of imperfect knowledge of the price elasticities of demand and 
supply for fossil fuels, especially for the large price increases caused by carbon taxes for major emissions 
cutbacks (Cline, 1992). This implies that setting the initial tax will be a hit-and-miss affair, and could thus 
induce hostile reactions from countries, industries, and consumers although it is not clear how serious an 
objection this is (Pearce, 1991). Moreover, in the context of global warming, the delays in adjusting the 
insufficient carbon tax to the desired level will imply more CO2 emissions emitted into the atmosphere than 
what would otherwise have occurred, thus leading to additional committed warming. 
                                                          
 Another complication of the carbon tax is the initial difference in energy prices. As a consequence of 
existing distortions by price regulations, taxation, national monopolies, barriers to trade and so on, there are 
initially great differences in energy prices, both between fuels and across countries (Hoeller and Coppel, 1-
992). If CO2 emissions are then to be reduced by similar amounts in two countries, ceteris paribus, lower taxes 
6 As a reflection of its success, the Program has cut the compliance costs to less than $100 per ton of SO2 
removed from early estimates of the expected costs ranging from $180 to $981 per ton during Phase I and 
from $374 to $981 per ton during Phase II (McLean, 1997).  
7 The Kyoto Protocol adopts the “commitment period” of five years that was originally proposed by the US 
as the “budget period”. The multi-year compliance is designed to avert the danger that a single-year target 
may pose due to fluctuations in economic performance or certain extreme weather conditions, and to 
provide countries with additional flexibility in meeting their targets. While enjoying such advantages, the 
multi-year compliance might undermine the actual scope of a country achievement in meeting its Kyoto 
obligations if monitoring, reporting and enforcement would not be adequate. This underlines the 
importance of setting up a very strict institutional framework to ensure stringent monitoring, frequent 
reporting and vigorous enforcement. The same holds for banking and borrowing of permits, which are 
another two ways to increase intertemporal flexibility and lower the cost of abating GHG emissions. 
8 What I mean by the “ecological transparency” argument is that if there were no the Kyoto Protocol, some 
governments would not be keen to adopt emissions trading because the quantity-based instrument would 
provide the public and their political opponents with a very clear reference to judge their performance.  
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are required for the country with low prices before the tax imposition than for the country with the higher pre-
tax prices. Thus, an eventual cost-efficient regime of international carbon tax would presumably need to 
remove existing distortions in international energy markets. Otherwise, countries with the lower pre-tax prices 
would enjoy free-rider benefits. 
 Third and most importantly, emissions trading offers a built-in feature of resource transfers by 
emission sources to developing countries. Such transfers are crucial to getting developing countries engaged in 
controlling GHG emissions (Wiener, 1997). Of course, it is not impossible to include transfers in an 
international scheme of carbon taxes, but the trouble with it is that we need an international agency to collect 
carbon taxes. Given the fact that the United Nations (UN) still have the difficulty in collecting their 
membership fees and that no other institution is of higher international jurisdiction than the UN, this will leave 
some doubt about its capacity in collecting international carbon taxes. Even if such agency manages to obtain 
the proceeds and uses them as transfers, there are still serious doubts as to whether it can efficiently manage 
such transfers. 
 Fourth, emissions trading is more attractive to firms than carbon taxes, because the latter scheme 
extracts revenues from firms without offering any compensation, not to mention the political difficulties of 
introducing such taxes in countries such as the US. So, even if a firm has to buy permits now to cover all of its 
emissions, it still can acquire the value of those additional permits by selling them in the future if its actual 
emissions are lower than what is allowed to emit. This in turn creates an incentive for firms to comply with 
their caps.   
 
 
III. BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR SETTING UP EMISSIONS TRADING 
 
 Even if international emissions trading is considered to be the most promising way to control GHG 
emissions (IPCC, 1996; UNCTAD, 1995), then, what are the basic requirements for setting up a successful 
scheme?  
 First, there should be legally binding national emissions targets and timetables for reducing GHG 
emissions for countries that would wish to participate in an international emissions trading scheme. Those 
coutries should be committed to the binding obligations. 
 Second, there should exist a reliable national registration of individual emissions sources that will 
participate in an emissions trading scheme. Without such an inventory of sources and their present emission 
levels, it would be impossible to design schemes for permit allocation by way of grandfathering permits. 
Moreover, since countries (not sources) sign the Kyoto Protocol and it is the responsibility of the governments 
to ensure that their countries are in compliance with the national emissions limits, inter-source trading would 
have to be accounted for at the national level. This also underlines the need for such an inventory. 
 Third, there should be in place some system of monitoring and reporting emissions. This is to ensure, 
among other purposes, that when banking of permits were allowed, emissions permits to be sold by any 
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sources would at least represent part of their real emissions reductions from the allowed emissions levels. This, 
combined with the above requirement for good emissions inventories, would provide certainty about the 
validity of permits traded, thus increasing confidence and incentives for inter-source trading. 
  Fourth, there should be effective enforcement aimed to detect those in non-compliance and apply 
sanctions. Although enforcement is necessary for effective application of other instruments as well (e.g., 
charges and regulations), this requirement is of particular importance to emissions trading because under an 
emissions trading scheme firms which operate in a country without adequate enforcement can emit without 
handing over their permits. Consequently, they can sell their permits to firms in other countries, thus leading to 
exceeded emissions in the sellers’ country. By contrast, when charges or regulations are used, firms which 
defraud cannot sell permits to sources in other countries. Clearly, if enforcement were not adequate, it would 
be easy for a firm to sell permits or refrain from buying permits without taking adequate measures to reduce its 
emissions. Consequently, an emissions trading scheme would lead to higher overall pollution levels compared 
with instruments like charges or regulations. Besides, enforcement at the international level often proves to be 
more difficult and less likely to be effective than at the national level because of the absence of an institution 
with the international jurisdiction to enforce policy. This further underlines the importance of national legal 
mechanisms for enforcement. 
 Annex I countries would so far qualify for engaging in emissions trading according to the first 
condition, but not all Annex I countries would do so if the other three conditions need to be fulfilled. Strictly 
speaking, this suggests that an emissions trading scheme might initially start with only a handful of Annex I 
countries, although it does not preclude its subsequent expansion to include other qualified countries 
according to the rules of procedure agreed before trading begins. Such an expansion would bring more 
emission sources into an international emissions trading scheme, reduce the leakage effects which occur when 
reduced GHG emissions in countries with caps are counteracted by increased emissions elsewhere in other 
countries without caps; it would lower the costs of abating emissions, and increase the scope for efficiency 
gains. 
 According to Article 17 (formerly numbered as Article 16 bis) of the Kyoto Protocol, the parties with 
targets included in Annex B, which lists 38 countries and the European Community, may participate in 
emissions trading for the purpose of fulfilling their commitments under Article 3 of this Protocol (UNFCCC, 
1997).9 While the Article has a loose stance on the qualifying requirement as we propose, it indicates that 
                                                          
9 In addition to Article 17, on the insistence of the EU, the Kyoto Protocol incorporates the “bubble” 
concept into the final text (Article 4). The “bubble” approach is often termed as “trading without rules” 
because it sets few restrictions on trading between parties. This makes it a potentially attractive instrument. 
Given great differences in environmental monitoring and enforcement infrastructures among Annex I 
countries, if it turns out to be too difficult to agree on the commonly-accepted rules and guidelines, the 
“bubble” approach at least opens the possibility of trading emissions permits within the voluntarily-formed 
group. However, the approach presents some drawbacks. First, it requires to set a cap on overall emissions 
for the group as a whole and to work out a specific cap for each member country within the group in an 
agreement, the terms of which must be notified to the UNFCCC Secretariat at the time of ratification of the 
Protocol. This has not proved easy for the EU to work out such an arrangement before Kyoto. The EU still 
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emissions trading is limited to Annex B countries. Even with the scope of participation, given great 
differences in environmental monitoring and enforcement infrastructures among Annex B countries, however, 
it will probably take years to agree on the commonly-accepted rules and guidelines “for verification, reporting 
and accountability for emissions trading” pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol. Even if they could have been 
worked out after lengthy negotiations, the scope of participation is very narrow, even in comparison with the 
WTO members which only represent part of the world community.10 Because non-Annex I countries have not 
committed themselves to any targets, Annex I countries have been pressured to take trade measures to protect 
their domestic industries against competition from those countries that do not adopt GHG emissions limits. If 




IV. SOME TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF EMISSIONS TRADING 
 
 The issue of compatibility of using trade measures against foreign environmental practices with 
the GATT has not been brought much attention until the findings of two GATT disputes panels on trade 
measures unilaterally taken by the US in the US-Mexico tuna-dolphin disputes were made public (Hudec, 
1996). Both panel reports (GATT, 1991, 1994), which are commonly referred to as Tuna/Dolphin I and 
Tuna/Dolphin II, found the US restrictions on tuna imports from Mexico, which did not meet the US 
standards on dolphin-safe fishing practices, in violation of GATT. The panel in Tuna/Dolphin I ruled that 
all trade restrictions directed against environmental harms have to be territorial. Moreover, such restrictions 
can not be justified under Article III if they relate to the process of production rather than the product itself. 
The panel explained that, if governments could regulate imports according to the production process by 
                                                                                                                                                                             
has the difficulty in redistributing the joint commitments because the Kyoto Protocol incorporates a basket 
of six GHG, rather than the EU’s originally-proposed three gases before Kyoto, and the uptake of GHG 
“by sinks resulting from direct human-induced land-use change and forestry activities”, at first “limited to 
afforestation, reforestation and deforestation since 1990” (Article 3.3). Second, it narrows the scope of 
efficiency gains in comparison with inter-source trading, because it restricts the location where firms or 
countries comply with their caps and because it is likely to have frightening transaction costs. Third, in the 
case of the current EU bubble, because the European Community (EC) itself as a party to the Protocol, in 
addition to its member states, has the legitimate responsibility for reporting on the performance of the EU 
as a whole and ensuring its declared targets as a whole under the notified agreement are met, the potential 
advantages of offering double coverage of reporting obligations and double assurance for abatement 
obligations could be hindered by the need to have complete and early information from individual member 
states (OECD, 1998). In the event that the EC as a whole would fail to meet its own targets and if a non-
compliance procedure would be established, the EC, together with those individual member states that 
have not achieved their own targets set out in the agreement, would thus be faced with sanctions under 
Article 4.6. In this case, who bears the responsibility of the EC itself? As such, some clarification for the 
clear division of responsibility in the terms of that agreement would be needed in the case where a regional 
economic integration organization itself were a party to the Protocol. Fourth, because Article 4 is framed in 
general terms and because no mandate to negotiate further rules has been given to the Conference of the 
Parties to the UNFCCC, it might create potential loopholes in meeting the Kyoto obligations. 
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which they were made, the rules of the GATT’s Article III would allow governments to require imports to 
conform to any type of social regulation currently imposed on the production process of domestic 
producers. It would allow governments to condition market access on compliance with domestic laws 
governing working conditions. The panel in Tuna/Dolphin II concluded that Article XX does not preclude 
governments from pursuing environmental concerns outside their national territory, but such extra-
jurisdictional application of domestic laws would be permitted only if aimed primarily at having a 
conservation or protection effect. The second panel ruled that the US restrictions were in violation of 
GATT because they aimed to force other countries to change their own policies in order to comply with the 
US standards. 
 The preceding discussion promotes the concern about the compatibility of an international 
emissions trading scheme with the GATT/WTO. In what follows, I will examine whether such emissions 
trading scheme has the potential to bring parties into conflict with the WTO provisions in dealing with the 
allocation of permits, non-compliance with emissions targets, emissions trading system enlargement, and trade 
measures against non-members of an emissions trading club. 
 
A. Allocation of permits 
 
 The Kyoto Protocol has set the caps on aggregate GHG emissions for Annex I countries. If trading 
among private parties is authorized, the next issue is how these governments allocate the assigned amounts 
within their countries. The allocation process itself represents the establishment and distribution of private 
property rights over emissions, and itself lies outside the mandate of the WTO (Vaughan, 1997).  
 The allocation of permits depends on the structure of national emissions trading systems. Such 
systems could be modelled as either “upstream” or “downstream” or “hybrid” systems. An “upstream” trading 
system would target fossil fuel producers and importers as regulated entities, so would reduce number of 
allowance holders to oil refineries and importers, natural gas pipelines, natural gas processing plants, coal 
mines and processing plants (Hargrave, 1998). For example, if such a system would be implemented in the 
US, the total number of allowance holders would be restricted to about 1900. Even with such a relatively small 
number of regulated sources, market power would not be an issue. In the above upstream system for the US, 
the largest firm has only a 5.6 percent market allowance share. Firms, with each having less than one percent 
share, would hold the lion’s share of allowances (Cramton and Kerr, 1998). Implemented effectively, an 
upstream system would capture virtually all fossil fuel use and carbon emissions in a national economy. Firms 
would raise fuel prices to offset the additional cost. In an upstream system the number of firms that has to be 
monitored for compliance is relatively small, thus it is easier to administer. Moreover, existing institutions for 
levying excises on fossil fuels, which exist in most industrialized countries, can be used to enforce the scheme 
(Zhang and Nentjes, 1998). However, one of the drawbacks of an upstream system is that it provides no 
                                                                                                                                                                             
10 Currently, the WTO has 132 members. More than 30 others are negotiating the accessions.  
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incentive for energy end-users to develop disposal technologies, the aspect that is deemed critical in searching 
the long-term solutions to solving climate change problems. 
 In contrast, a “downstream” trading system would be applied at the point of emissions. As such, a 
large number of diverse energy users are included. This would offer greater competition and stimulate more 
robust trading, thus leading to increased innovation. However, such a system would be more difficult to 
administer, especially concerning emissions from the transportation sector and other small sources. On the 
other hand, it would avoid that some energy users do not respond to the price signal, which might occur in an 
upstream system because of market imperfections such as high transaction costs, high discount rates and 
imperfect information, although the extent of their responsiveness depends on the degree of competition and 
on whether price increases are actually passed on to the consumers. To keep a downstream trading system at a 
manageable level, regulated sources could be limited to utilities and large industrial sources. Governments 
could then address uncapped sources through other regulatory means such as carbon taxes. In doing so, 
however, the governments need to establish additional programs. This would be administratively burdensome, 
let alone the political difficulties of introducing carbon taxes in some countries. Moreover, the actual achieve-
ments in reductions of CO2 emissions by a proposed carbon tax remain uncertain because of imperfect 
knowledge of the price elasticities of demand and supply for fossil fuels, especially for the large price 
increases caused by carbon taxes for major emissions cutbacks (Cline, 1992). This would put the governments 
at risk of non-compliance with the emissions commitments.  
 Alternatively, national trading systems could be modelled as “hybrid” systems (Zhang and Nentjes, 
1998). A hybrid system is similar to a downstream trading system in the sense that regulated sources at the 
levels of energy users are also limited to utilities and large industrial sources. On the other hand, like an 
upstream trading system, a hybrid system would require fuel distributors to hold allowances for small fuel 
users and to pass on their permit costs in a mark-up on the fuel price. As such, small fuel users are exempted 
from the necessity (and transaction costs) of holding allowances. Yet the rise in fuel price will motivate them 
to reduce fuel consumption or to switch from fuels with a high carbon content, such as coal, to fuels with a 
low carbon content, such as natural gas.  
 No matter how national trading systems are modelled, importers and domestic producers of fossil 
fuels should be treated equally in obtaining emissions allowances under the like product provisions in the 
WTO. Moreover, regardless of whether individual countries choose to empower private trading, the ultimate 
responsibility for fulfilling the Kyoto commitments would remain with the national government as a party to 
the Protocol. 
 Given the great concern about international competitiveness, however, the allocation of permits does 
have the potential to bring parties into conflict with the WTO provisions. Some fear, for example, that 
governments could allocate the permits in such a manner to favour domestic firms against foreign rivals. This 
will violate the WTO principle of non-discrimination. The allocation of permits could also be designed in such 
a manner to advantage certain sectors over others and further enhance their existing imperfect market 
competition. This makes the unequal treatment explicit, which can be much easier hidden from the general 
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public if the conventional command-and-control regulations are used. This in turn would have a similar price 
distortion effect as a subsidy, and would be in conflict with the WTO rules that prohibit the use of export 
subsidies for such a purpose. All this clearly indicates that the manner in which countries allocate their 
assigned amounts should be compatible with these WTO principles and should not constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. 
 However, it should be pointed out that although grandfathering is thought of as giving implicit 
subsidies to some sectors, grandfathering is less trade-distorted than the exemptions from carbon taxes. To 
understand their difference, it is important to bear in mind that grandfathering itself also implies an 
opportunity cost for firms receiving permits: what matters here is not how you get your permits, but what you 
can sell them for - that is what determines opportunity cost (Zhang and Nentjes, 1998). Thus, relative prices of 
products will not be that distorted and switching of demands towards products of those firms whose permits 
are awarded gratis (the so-called substitution effect) not be induced by grandfathering. This makes 
grandfathering different from the exemptions from carbon taxes. In the latter case, there exist substitution 
effects. For example, the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) proposal for a mixed carbon and 
energy tax provides for exemptions for the six energy-intensive industries (i.e., iron and steel, non-ferrous 
metals, chemicals, cement, glass, and pulp and paper) from coverage of the CEC tax on grounds of 
competitiveness. This not only reduces the effectiveness of the CEC tax in achieving its objective of reducing 
CO2 emissions, but also makes the industries, which are exempt from paying the CEC tax, improve their 
competitive position in relation to those industries which are not. There will therefore be some switching of 
demand towards the products of these energy-intensive industries, which is precisely the reaction that such a 
tax should avoid (Zhang, 1997a). 
 With the great concern that a government that grandfathers permits to a domestic firm could give it 
a competitive advantage over similar firm in another country where permits are not awarded gratis, some 
thought that there is a need for the harmonisation of allocation of permits. However, we think that 
individual governments should be left free to devise their own ways of allocating permits on the following 
grounds.11 First, we think this is not necessarily the case, because even if a firm obtains emissions permits 
by auction, if necessary, its government still can protect its international competitiveness by means of 
recycling the revenues raised through auctioned permits to lower other pre-existing distortionary taxes, 
such as taxes on labour and capital.  
 Second, although auctioning at least part of the assigned amounts to sub-national legal entities 
alleviates to some extent the concern about international competitiveness, any attempts to produce an 
agreement on a common rate are likely to run into concerns about national sovereignty and thus would 
encounter significant political difficulties. Take the above CEC proposal for a carbon/energy tax as an 
example. National sovereignty considerations to some extent explain why the CEC proposal for a 
carbon/energy tax failed to gain the unanimous support of its member states, partly because some member 
                                                          
11 See Zhang and Nentjes (1998) for other reasons that are not given here. 
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states opposed an increase in the fiscal competence of the Community and thus opposed the introduction at 
a European level of a new tax on grounds of fiscal sovereignty (Bill, 1997). 
 Third, given great differences in national circumstances, setting a uniform rule of allocation will 
restrict the rights of individual governments to select the option which is best suited to their own national 
circumstances. Indeed, the failure of the above CEC carbon/energy tax is to some extent because some 
member states are loath to restrict themselves to the common CEC-specified policy and measure design to 
stabilize CO2 emission and the way how to do it. With second-best considerations, it is conceivable that 
some countries whose economies are heavily distorted would decide to auction permits, and that the revenues 
generated through auctioned permits could then be used to reduce pre-existing distortionary taxes, thus 
generating overall efficiency gains. Parry et al. (1997), for example, show that the costs of reducing US 
carbon emissions by 10% are four times more costly under a grandfathered carbon permits case than under an 
auctioned case. This disadvantage reflects the inability to make use of the revenue-recycling effect in the 
former case. 
 Fourth and importantly, leaving individual governments the freedom to devise their own ways of 
allocating assigned amounts to sub-national entities would ensure that any individual government 
maintains its right to determine the domestic policies and measures that would be taken to meet its Kyoto 
obligations. For example, a government that wants to use taxes or regulations for domestic emissions 
control could retain the sole right to trade. Alternatively, a government could allocate its assigned amounts 
to private entities to trade. 
 
B. Emissions trading system enlargement 
 
 The Kyoto Protocol allows Russia to emit the same volume of greenhouse gases as the then 
Russia did in 1990. Given the fact that CO2 emissions in Russia declined over the past years after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and are expected to continue declining, that means that Russia should 
be left as the biggest seller of emissions permits among Annex I countries once emissions trading takes 
place. The US has reached a conceptual agreement with Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Russia 
and Ukraine to pursue an umbrella group to trade emissions permits (USDOS, 1998). It is believed that the 
US is counting on emissions trading with Russia to achieve half of its 7% reduction target set in the Kyoto 
Protocol.12 Although the US insists on bringing non-Annex I countries into an emissions trading scheme, 
which has widely been seen as creating a source of such permits for the US to buy and therefore achieve its 
own agreed reductions through offshore compliance,13 it might seem that the US does not want the EU to 
breathe Russian “hot air”14 because the addition of the EU to the group would raise the prices of the 
                                                          
12 “Emissions Trading Discussions to Exclude EU”, Japan Times, 25 February 1998. 
13 See Section V for a further discussion. 
14 When emissions trading were allowed, a country whose legally binding GHG emissions limits set by the 
Kyoto Protocol exceed its actual or anticipated emissions requirements would be able to trade these excess 
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Russian emissions permits that the American firms would have to pay.15 On the other hand, Russia would 
not welcome the addition of non-Annex I countries, such as China and India, to the group because these 
new entrants would raise the supply of overall permits on the market and depress the prices of those 
permits held by Russia. This is also one of the reasons for the developing countries’ opposition to 
emissions trading because they feel that it leaves them out of the system at this stage, although for some 
legitimate reasons these countries do not want to join in an emissions trading club at this moment. 
Although these are just political speculations, they underline the importance to establish clear rules of 
procedure about admitting new entrants before emissions trading begins.16 
 There are two avenues to establish such rules of procedure. One is based on voting to admit new 
entrants. So far any decisions made by the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC have been generally 
adopted by consensus. If admitting new entrants requires consensus by all current Annex B countries eligible 
for emissions trading, this confers on Russia a de facto power of veto. Thus, if avenue to admit new entrants 
rests on voting, a three-fourth majority vote of the current Annex B countries present and voting at the 
meeting could be adopted to prevent exploitation of market power. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
emissions, thus creating the “hot air” that would otherwise have not occurred. The “hot air” problem is 
particularly acute in Russia whose emissions are not expected to rise to its 1990 level until 2008. The “hot 
air” forms a “reservoir” from which some advanced Western countries, if not all, can simply buy emissions 
permits to make up any shortfall, instead of taking any serious domestic actions. This is one of the reasons 
why some countries have called for imposing a percentage limitation on the use of emissions trading. 
Indeed, such limitation was included in earlier negotiation drafts of the article about emissions trading, but 
on the insistence of the US does not appear in the final Protocol. The only leftover from this debate is the 
provision that “such trading shall be supplemental to domestic actions”. If a country like the US would 
count on emissions trading with Russia to achieve half of its reduction target set in the Kyoto Protocol, 
emissions trading would then not be regarded as a “supplemental” means according to the common sense. 
As such, some clarification for interpreting the terms is needed. Besides, it should be pointed out that 
although emission trading makes the “hot air” problem explicit, the problem is related to targets setting, not 
to emissions trading per se. Even if such a flaw has now been built into the Kyoto Protocol, however, we 
have to deal with it in designing an effective emissions trading scheme in order to minimize its damage. 
Instead of imposing a percentage limitation on the use of emissions trading, we propose a transaction tax 
on trades involving “taxable” allowances, with the tax rate to be set by the Conference of the Parties. Such 
a tax rate could be imposed only on the buyer and could differ to reflect the direction of emissions trading 
flows, with a uniform zero or low rate for transactions within the advanced OECD countries themselves 
but a uniform high rate for transactions between them and countries with economies in transition. Setting a 
uniform low and uniform high rate is to prevent countries from attracting more trade by setting an even 
lower transaction tax rate of their own. An alternative strategy would allow emissions reductions below 
internationally accepted national baselines for the pre-2008 period within the jurisdiction of the advanced 
OECD countries prior to the beginning of the first commitment period to be credited for later use. This would 
also reduce their demand for the “hot air” during the commitment period. 
15 That the EU was not invited to participate in the meeting of the above umbrella group, on March 5-6, 
1998, Washington, DC, which aimed to discuss the specific ways to implement emissions trading, has 
triggered the speculation. 
16 The interpretation that the relevant rules and guidelines should be established first before emissions 
trading begins is in line with Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, which puts the text of establishing the rules 
prior to who are eligible for emissions trading. This clearly indicates that those claims that emissions 
trading can start immediately are in violation of Article 17. 
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 The second avenue rests on automatic phase-in once one prospective country meets pre-determined 
criteria. In our view, the second is superior to the first avenue. Such criteria should include under what 
conditions, how and when new entrant could be incorporated into the emissions trading scheme. Once such 
criteria are set, they should remain stable in the short run although it by no means precludes any adjustments 
that might be required in the future. 
 Similar reasons hold for expansion to include other greenhouse gases than CO2 and the uptake of 
GHG by sinks17 because a comprehensive coverage of both gases and options will induce more cost-effective 
abatement options. On the other hand, a workable emissions trading scheme requires that emissions of 
whatever a pollutant to be included have to be measured with reasonable accuracy. This requirement implicitly 
precludes including all gases in the initial trading scheme. However, limiting trading to a subset of gases is 
not likely to be effective unless the Protocol is further amended to partition the assigned amounts into two 
categories—tradable and non-tradable gases with separate goals being assigned for each (UNCTAD, 
1998). Without a separation of categories, it seems to be lack of a legal basis to reject the legitimate claim 
from those countries that use the flexibility inherent in the equivalence process to substitute freely among 
the gases, because Article 5.3 of the Protocol has authorized that the global warming potentials are used to 
translate non-CO2 greenhouse gases into carbon equivalent units in determining each Annex I party’s 
compliance with its assigned amounts. 
 No matter what kind of rules are established, they would, no doubt, have profound implications 
for the world trading system. 
 
C. Non-compliance with the agreed emissions targets 
 
 The Kyoto Protocol itself does not contain stipulations on what actions, if any, should be taken in the 
events of a country were found to be in non-compliance. Without clear criteria to judge compliance, it is 
difficult to believe that many of Annex I countries will be willing to ratify the Protocol. The US had proposed 
to penalise a country that failed to meet its target by imposing ever larger reduction obligations over a 
subsequent period (the so-called borrowing with a penalty), but negotiators at Kyoto blocked the only 
compliance mechanism on the table because they fear that would not bring any additional pressure to bear on a 
country that simply continues to disregard its commitments. It is then natural to think to use trade measures -- 
usually in the form of a trade restriction -- to enforce a country in compliance with its commitment. In this 
case, caution should be taken because all WTO retaliation is limited to a “compensatory” amount, that is, an 
amount equivalent to the value of the trade obligations being nullified or impared by the other party. Its 
                                                          
17 Sinks here refer to those vehicles for absorbing anthropogenic GHG emissions. Oceans, soils and forests 
all offer some potential to serve as sinks for net carbon sequestration. For practical reasons, however, the 
Kyoto Protocol only authorizes the uptake of GHG “by sinks resulting from direct human-induced land-use 
change and forestry activities”, at first “limited to afforestation, reforestation and deforestation since 
1990”. 
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main significance is that it rejects a more aggressive approach towards sanctions, the approach under which 
a legal sanction must be large enough to produce the desired change of behavior (Hudec, 1996). 
 
D. Trade measures against non-members of an emissions trading club 
 
 Because non-Annex I countries have not committed themselves to any targets, Annex I countries 
have been pressured by their powerful lobbying groups to take trade measures to protect their domestic 
industries against competition from non-Annex I countries. Then what kind of trade measures could be 
potentially applied against non-members of an emissions trading club in order to counter the trade effects of 
honouring their Kyoto commitments? One possibility might be that Annex I countries comply with their 
Kyoto commitments, but use border adjustment taxes based on embodied carbon content of goods imported 
from non-Annex I countries to keep non-Annex I countries’ emissions at their baseline levels. 18 Another 
possibility is that Annex I countries abide by their Kyoto commitments, but set imports of energy-intensive 
goods from non-Annex I countries at their baseline levels or set exports of energy-intensive goods from 
non-Annex I countries at their baseline levels. The third possibility is that Annex I countries abide by their 
Kyoto commitments, but provide subsidies up to the levels at which their exports of energy-intensive 
goods remain at their baseline levels. Although these trade measures appear only to include the component 
designed to reduce GHG emissions leakage, they are in principle in conflict with the GATT/WTO 
principles of most favoured nation and non-discrimination. Such taxes could fall foul of the like product 
provisions in the GATT’s Article I and Article III that are designed to prevent a country from discriminating 
against imports on the basis of their territorial origin (WTO, 1995). There are formidable technical difficulties, 
if not entirely impossible, in identifying the appropriate carbon contents embodied in virtually all traded 
products unless non-Annex I exporting countries are willing to cooperate in certifying how the products are 
produced. In the absence of any information regarding the carbon content of the products from non-Annex I 
countries, importing Annex-I countries may prescribe the tax rates based on their domestically predominant 
method of production for the imported products.19 Such a practice will violate the GATT rules that do not 
allow to take trade measures on a basis of the differences in process and production methods (PPM), and 
appears to deprive non-Annex I countries of enjoying the very basis of comparative advantage in their 
production. Moreover, such tariffs would likely violate commitments made by the WTO contracting countries 
not to raise import taxes above “bound tariff” levels, i.e. maximum tariffs for goods listed in an annex to the 
GATT (WTO, 1995). The WTO rules also prohibit the use of export subsidies to advantage certain sectors 
over others. 
                                                          
18 The baseline levels in this Section refer to those emissions, imports or exports when either Annex I or 
non-Annex I countries have not adopted emissions targets. As discussed in Zhang (1997a, 1997b), 
establishing such future national baselines is not a simple matter. 
19 This practice is by no means without foundation. For example, the US Secretary of the Treasury has 
adopted the approach in the tax on imported toxic chemicals (Poterba and Rotemberg, 1995). 
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 Are there any potential avenues within the WTO rules to accommodate Annex I countries on this 
score, should they decide to pursue the above offsetting trade measures? One avenue would be that Annex 
I countries could claim general exceptions under the GATT’s Article XX, which states that:  
 
“Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall 
be constructed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
... (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
... (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption; ...” (WTO, 
1995, p. 519). 
 
 Article XX itself is the exceptions that authorize governments to employ otherwise GATT-illegal 
measures when such measures are necessary to deal with certain enumerated social policy problems. Since 
Annex I countries participating emissions trading are obligated to limit their GHG emissions, while non-
Annex I countries are not bound by such commitments, the same conditions do not exist for Annex I 
countries and non-Annex I countries. Therefore, Annex I countries could argue that the discrimination in 
the trade restrictions is neither arbitrary nor unjustifiable, thus meeting the requirement in the preamble to 
Article XX.20 Under Article 2.2 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, technical regulations 
shall not be more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil a “legitimate objective”, which is defined as 
including the protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment 
(WTO, 1995), the offsetting trade measures could be based on legitimate environmental objective and not 
merely on formal membership of an international agreement (Brack, 1996). So, if any non-Annex I 
countries voluntarily assume binding emissions targets, a prerequisite for engaging in emissions trading, 
through amendment to the Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol,21 they should be exempted from such trade 
restrictions. This is of particular importance to newly industrialising countries because they are the 
countries that are most likely to make such voluntary commitments among non-Annex I countries. This is 
not without precedent. For example, the Montreal Protocol22 has included the provision that exempts non-
parties from trade measures if they are determined by the parties to be in compliance with the phase-out 
schedules. Indeed, the US has proposed at Kyoto to allow non-Annex I countries to voluntarily adopt GHG 
                                                          
20 Brack (1996) has used this argument to justify the discriminatory trade measures applied against non-
parties to the Montreal Protocol. 
21 Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol and Annex I to the UNFCCC are now identical in nature, although they 
are slightly different numerically. This deliberate change from Annex I into Annex B potentially allows a 
developing country to engage in emissions trading if it voluntarily adopts an emissions target and is 
inscribed in Annex B. 
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controls so that non-Annex I countries can also be brought into an emissions trading club. However, the 
group of 77 and China23 blocked the US proposal. The underlying reasons for their objections are given 
below. First, on ethical grounds, non-Annex I countries think that Annex I countries have caused the 
climate change problem and should thus clean it up themselves before asking non-Annex I countries to 
take actions. Second,  non-Annex I countries insist that the US demand for developing countries’ 
commitments goes against an earlier United Nations agreement, known as the Berlin Mandate adopted at 
the first Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in Berlin in April 1995, which specifically indicated 
that “a protocol or another legal instrument” adopted at the third Conference of the Parties in Kyoto should 
“not introduce any new commitments” for non-Annex I countries. Third, there is the widespread fear that 
the opportunity to trade emissions permits might eventually lure others in the group, especially the Latin 
American nations, to be drawn into making commitments of their own. Then rich Annex I countries might 
use emissions trading as a means of buying their way out of responsibility for climate problems and at the 
same time postponing the radical changes in their own consumption patterns and passing the responsibility on 
to the poor, while GHG emissions limits grow subsequently tighter on the developing countries. 
 In addition, Annex I countries might argue that to support the operation of an emissions trading 
scheme that is designed to protect health and conserve depletable fossil fuels, some kind of offsetting trade 
measures would be required and qualify for the exceptions under Article XX(b) and Article XX(g) because 
international emissions leakage would otherwise frustrate its intent (Babiker et al., 1997). Furthermore, 
although such measures would not be the least trade-distorting, they are much less trade-restrictive than the 
tariff suggested by Hoel (1996), which also includes the optimal trade tariff term. 
 Another avenue rests on Article 1.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
under which a subsidy is defined as including “government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not 
collected” (WTO, 1995). Although a narrow interpretation of this clause would limit claims to cases in 
which taxes are levied but not collected, its broad interpretation would expose the absence of 
environmental taxes to charges of unfair subsidisation (Esty, 1994). So Annex I countries could argue that 
the absence of emissions targets for non-Annex I countries would be equivalent to giving an implicit unfair 
export subsidies biased towards their energy-intensive sectors (the so-called ecological dumping), because 
the costs of environmental degradation are not part of the prices of those exported products. 
 Although Annex I countries could justify their offsetting trade measures according to Article XX 
and the definition of lax environmental regulation as a countervailable subsidy, non-Annex I countries of 
the WTO would, no doubt, resist such interpretations. Since environmental issue was simply not a public 
issue in 1947 when GATT was signed, exploring the environmental exceptions to the general free trade 
                                                                                                                                                                             
22 The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer was signed in 1987. The Protocol 
has since been amended and strengthened in a number of aspects (see, for example, Brack (1996)). 
23 As has been the case in the international climate change negotiations, the developing countries express 
their consensus views as the group of 77 and China’s positions. Divergent or dissenting views are then 
expressed separately, representing either individual countries or smaller groups, such as the Alliance of 
Small Island States (AOSIS). 
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requirements in GATT as much as depends on interpretation as on the actual clauses (Charnovitz, 1991). 
Given the fact that a three-fourths vote of the entire membership is required for the membership to adopt 
legal interpretation of any WTO agreement (WTO, 1995), the above interpretations might stand a little 
chance of being accepted by non-Annex I countries that form the majority of the WTO members. 
 Besides, lessons from the Montreal Protocol may be instructive. The Protocol prohibits with non-
parties trade in ozone-depleting substances (ODS) themselves, products containing ODS, and possibly 
products made using but not containing ODS. The trade restrictions were used together with financial 
assistance (i.e., Multilateral Fund in this case) and technology transfer as a means to coerce or force 
countries to become parties. Although the Protocol has succeeded in securing universal participation by 
means of  the “carrot and stick” approach as the signatories to it make up more than 95% of current world 
consumption and production of ODS, the fact remains that restrictions are discriminatory. While the 
restrictions have not been contested by the WTO members, the WTO Secretariat has voiced its opposition 
to such uses of trade restrictions, and its Committee on Trade and Environment has voiced not to welcome 
their replication in an emissions trading scheme (Barrett, 1994; Vaughan, 1997), because such measures 
appear to violate the GATT/WTO principles of most favoured nation, national treatment and non-
discrimination. In the Montreal Protocol, this discriminatory restrictions are not that important given the scope 
of its membership wider than the WTO itself, since most of the potential for trade conflict arises with non-
parties to the Protocol. However, if they were used in climate problems, economic implications could be 
substantial because an emissions trading club is only a small subset of the WTO members, at least at its 
initial stage. Moreover, there may be some legitimate reasons24 why many of non-Annex I countries, if not 
all, might want to remain outside an emissions trading club unless side payments are offered to these 
countries such that they are not made worse off as members than they would be as non-members. Thus, it 




V. JOINT IMPLEMENTATION WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
 Countries may differ with respect to assimilative capacities and to tastes and preferences for 
environmental quality. Thus, the harmonisation of environmental policy would not be always necessary 
from an environmental point of view, and may lead to sub-optimal use of the environment from an 
economics point of view. On the other hand, from the industrialised countries’ perspective, the lack of 
developing countries’ involvement in combating climate change aggravates their short-term concerns about 
international competitiveness. Non-participation by developing countries increases emissions leakage that 
                                                          
24 Such as disagreement about scientific evidence, different perspective on the responsibility for climate 
problems, different priority to divert its limited resources, different risk acceptance thresholds, and 
disagreement about the burden-sharing of abating GHG emissions. 
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could arise in the short term, as emissions controls lower world fossil fuel prices, and in the long term, as 
industries relocate to developing countries to avoid emissions controls at home. In addition, it raises the 
spectre of developing countries becoming “locked in” to more fossil fuel intensive economy and eliminates 
the Annex I countries’ opportunity to obtain low-cost abatement options. Testifying on 4th March 1998 before 
the House Commerce Subcommittee on Energy and Power about the domestic economic implications of the 
Kyoto Protocol, Dr. Janet Yellen (1998), Chair of the White House’s Council of Economic Advisers, stated 
that when there is no emissions trading at all, the cost of complying with the Kyoto target for the US would 
run to $125 per ton of carbon. With emissions trading only among Annex I countries, the cost would drop to 
$30-50 per ton. With fully worldwide emissions trading, the cost would further drop to $14-23 per ton. This 
clearly explains why the US puts heavy emphasis on the involvement of developing countries. Indeed, recent 
Indonesian bush fires choking Southeast Asia served as a graphic reminder that developing countries have an 
important part to play in protecting the environment against global warming. 
 For some time to come, however, many developing countries would be not qualified for participating 
in an international emissions trading scheme. This promotes the concern: how can we encourage their 
participation in combating global climate change, given the fact that there are a great deal of low-cost 
abatement options there? One widely recognised option to bring the developing countries on board is by 
means of joint implementation (JI).25 Indeed, many OECD countries are keen to see JI as a key part of the 
Kyoto Protocol, even although it is not without conceptual and operational problems, such as the form of JI, 
criteria for JI, the establishment of baselines against which the effects of JI projects can be measured, and the 
verification of emissions reductions of JI projects (Zhang, 1997a, 1997b). In brief, JI means that the investor 
in one country invests in emissions abatement projects in another (host) country where the costs of abating 
GHG emissions are lower than trying to achieve an equivalent abatement within the own country and is 
credited, in whole or in part, for emissions abatements in its own GHG accounts. By shifting the burden of 
carrying out abatement into non-Annex I countries, JI thus offers the potential for lowering the global costs 
of abating GHG emissions and succeeds in reducing GHG emissions leakage without discriminating against 
such countries (Barrett, 1994). In the WTO jargon, JI offers a positive incentive for countries to participate 
in an international agreement: 
 
“when cooperation is not voluntarily forthcoming, positive incentives are the best way to achieve 
sustained inter-governmental cooperation. Positive incentives can include offers of financial 
assistance and transfers of environmentally friendly technology directly related to the problem at 
hand, as well as more broadly based offers, for example, to increase foreign aid, to lessen debt 
problems and to make non-discriminatory reductions in trade barriers.” (GATT, 1992). 
                                                          
25 This kind of joint implementation between one Annex I country with emissions targets and one non-
Annex I country without emissions targets has now been termed as the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1997). However, we still use the customary terms JI instead 
of  the CDM. 
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  However, bringing the developing countries on board and integrating JI credit trading into an 
international GHG emissions scheme promotes another concern about the credibility of the scheme. How can 
such an international scheme incorporate credits from JI projects and at the same time ensure that the 
confidence in the scheme is not compromised? One option would restrict the amount of JI credits that could be 
bought by Annex I countries for compliance from non-Annex I countries. Another option, which is superior to 
the first option, would be to discount the credits awarded to JI projects. Such reduced crediting could provide 
an “environmental bonus” and at the margin allow for the uncertainty about reported emission reductions of JI 
projects. Moreover, I advocate a predetermined discount factor, a view shared by the CCAP (1997). In order 
to reflect the characteristics of a JI project and the differing quality of GHG monitoring and reporting 
infrastructures across countries, such a discount factor should differ both per type of project and per country 
and should be accordingly adjusted over time for those countries in order to reflect the improvement in their 
monitoring and reporting infrastructures. I think that a predetermined discounting approach is superior to a 
market-driven discounting approach, because the former would protect against the introduction of false credits 
into an emissions trading scheme, and provide non-Annex I countries with financial incentives to opt for 
binding commitments and develop their stringent monitoring and reporting infrastructures. In addition, only 
verified and certified JI credits would become part of the emissions trading scheme. Once certified, these 
credits could be treated as homogenous in quality to all other permits. 
 It should be pointed out that the group of 77 and China have not proved very receptive to the concept 
of JI for some legitimate reasons. It is also unclear if the US Congress will support such a mechanism, 
although for reasons very different from those used for the group of 77 and China. Given the fact that JI, by 
definition, will not shift the burden of paying for abating GHG emissions into non-Annex I countries, which 
could result in a large outflow of investment capital from the US to non-Annex I countries, some influential 





 The Kyoto Protocol, despite its apparent flaws in its current form, is the first international 
environmental agreement that sets legally binding GHG emissions targets and timetables for Annex I 
countries. Its Article 17 authorizes emissions trading between Annex I countries. If properly designed, 
emissions trading can effectively reduce their abatement costs while assisting Annex I countries in achieving 
their Kyoto obligations. 
 This article has examined the compatibility of an international emissions trading scheme with the 
GATT/WTO. It has been found that in dealing with the allocation of permits, non-compliance with emissions 
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targets, and emissions trading system enlargement, emissions trading has the potential to bring parties into 
conflict with the WTO provisions. WTO will also have to resolve the very difficult question of what to do 
about Annex I countries of the WTO, should they decide to pursue the offsetting trade measures against 
non-Annex I countries of the WTO, who for some legitimate reasons have decided to remain outside an 
emissions trading club. In this regard, JI may offer the way out because it succeeds in reducing GHG 
emissions leakage without discriminating against such countries. However, the prospect for JI depends on 
how JI is implemented and on whether mutual mistrust between Annex I and non-Annex I countries can be 
removed. In any case, breakthroughs in low-cost energy efficient technologies and the ways to transfer such 
technologies play a key role in acceptably drawing developing countries into the battle against global climate 
change. The ozone experience has shown that when low-cost substitution technologies start becoming 
available and when their transfers to developing countries takes place on fair and most favourable 
conditions, there is little difficulty in persuading developing countries to join. This underlines the 
importance for governments to enhance energy R&D and for the WTO Committee on Trade and 
Environment to explore the possibility of envisioning a more flexible patenting and intellectual property 
rights scheme that allows developing countries to acquire such technologies on preferential terms under the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. 
 It should be pointed out that although greenhouse gases offer an even more attractive case for 
application of emissions trading than many local pollutants already well handled with emissions trading, the 
US Sulphur Allowance Trading Program cannot just be transplanted to the international terrain where legal 
and institutional ingredients differ substantially from those in the US. It will probably take years, if not 
decades, of setting up such an international scheme. This raises the political question about the credibility of 
achieving Kyoto commitments and, at the same time, promotes the necessity of investigating effective national 
policies that can influence the behaviour of firms and consumers and establish the credibility of long-term 
goals. As such, interim measures before the beginning of the first commitment period in 2008 warrant special 
attention. They include national emissions trading scheme with looser controls than are required by the Kyoto 
Protocol, crediting early emissions reductions below internationally accepted national baselines prior to 2008 
within the jurisdiction of the advanced OECD countries, tax incentives to promote energy efficient 
technologies, signals of carbon taxes to be levied at a specific future date, and government’s role as a larger 
buyer to create stronger demand for energy efficient technologies. Indeed, taking interim measures are 
necessary because Article 3.2 of the Kyoto Protocol requires Annex I countries to “have made 





                                                                                                                                                                             
26 Rep. Bill Archer (R-Texas), Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, for example, said that “It 
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